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Infrastructures: The Role of
Modelling and Simulation
Chiara Foglietta and Stefano Panzieri
Abstract
Resilience and risk are fundamental concepts for critical infrastructure
protection, but it is complex to assess them. Modelling critical infrastructure
interdependency helps in evaluating the resilience and risk metrics. We propose the
MHR approach as a road-map to model infrastructures and it is implemented using
CISIApro 2.0. MHR suggests considering three different layers in each infrastruc-
ture: holistic, service and reductionist agents. In this chapter, this framework has
been tested in a scenario made of a modern telecommunication network, a hospital
ward and a smart factory. The scenario takes into account cyber attacks and their
consequences on the components, services and holistic nodes. The proposed frame-
work is under validation within the EU H2020 RESISTO project with good results
and in various test-beds.
Keywords: resilience metric, risk management, critical infrastructure modelling,
simulation
1. Introduction
Critical Infrastructure is an evolving concept. Critical infrastructure was linked
to aging public works in the 1980s: the National Council on Public Works Improve-
ment in 1988 focused on public sector infrastructure. In the 1990s, infrastructure
was redefined in terms of national security as a consequence of increased interna-
tional terrorism. The number of critical infrastructure sectors in the National Infra-
structure Protection Plan [1] has been enlarged to 17 since 9/11: it includes
agriculture and food systems, the defense-industrial base, electricity systems, pub-
lic health and health care facilities, national monuments, banking and financial
systems, drinking water systems, chemical services, commercial buildings, dams,
emergency services, nuclear power plants, information technology networks, tele-
communications systems, postal and shipping services, transportation systems, and
government facilities. Critical infrastructure is identified in Europe under the term
“essential services” [2].
Shifting the concept of critical infrastructures has led to more flexibility and
adaptability. The sophistication of an already complicated field, on the other hand,
is increased, creating more confusion and more doubts. The definition of “lifeline
system”, [3] was then established by some researchers to assess the efficiency of
large, geographically distributed networks during crises caused by adverse events,
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such as natural disasters or cyber-attacks. Lifelines are classified into six major
systems: electricity, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste
management, and water provision. The economic well-being, security, and protec-
tion of our lives are closely related to those systems. Thinking of critical infrastruc-
ture across the sub-set of lifelines helps to simplify features common to important
support structures and to enhance the performance of large networks, offering
visibility into the technical challenges.
Lifeline systems, mostly on the basis of physical proximity and operational
interaction, are interdependent. Cables and pipes are placed alongside each other in
crowded area, resulting in an elevated risk due to proximity. Damage to one infra-
structure component, such as an electrical cable, will easily ripple into damage to
adjacent components, such as telecommunications cables and gas mains, with
system-wide implications.
Lifeline systems are dependent on each other. Electric power networks, for
example, supply electricity for pumping stations, storage facilities, and equipment
control for transmission and distribution systems for oil and natural gas. Oil pro-
vides fuel and lubricants for generators, and natural gas provides energy for gener-
ating stations, compressors, and storage, all of which are required for the operation
of electric power networks.
In the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, resilience is defined as “the capability of a
strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially by
compressive stress” [4]. Definitions vary slight, but all of them relate the principle
of resilience to physical stress recovery.
A notable change from securing critical infrastructures to ensuring that com-
munities are resilient has taken place following Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore,
the concept of resilience is evolving, as the idea of critical infrastructures. In its
present form, a society’s resilience is an overarching attribute that reflects the
degree of community preparedness and the ability to respond to a crisis and
rebound from it. Since lifelines are intimately linked to the economic well-being,
security, and social fabric of a community, community resilience is closely related
to the initial strength and gradual recovery of lifelines.
Debate over the concept of resilience is likely to persist, and refinements and
elaborations of the term are to be expected. A framework for defining resilience has
been suggested by the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (MCEER) [5]. Resilience for both physical and social systems can be
conceptualized as having four infrastructural qualities:
• Robustness: the inherent strength or resistance in a system to withstand
external demands without degradation or loss of functionality.
• Redundancy: system property that under stress allows for alternate solutions,
decisions, and substitutions.
• Resourcefulness: the capacity to coordinate needed assets and services in crises.
• Rapidity: the speed at which disruption can be overcome and safety, services,
and financial stability restored.
As shown in Figure 1, an infrastructural performance, such as robustness, Q tð Þ,
can be visualized as a percentage that varies with time. For buildings, Q tð Þ may be
the percentage of structural or functional integrity. For lifelines, Q tð Þ may be the
percentage of customers that successfully receive power or drinking water. Prior to
a natural hazard, severe accident, terrorist act, or a general disruption, Q tð Þ is at 100
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percent; in picture is defined as normal performance. If the system is fully robust, it
remains at 100 percent even during disruptions. Total loss of service results in 0
percent of Q tð Þ. If system disturbance occurs at time t0, in response to, for example,
an earthquake or hurricane, damage to the infrastructure may reduce the perfor-
mance to less than 100 percent, the emergency threshold. Level of service, as
reflected by the robustness of the system, is a function of the probability and
consequences of damage. Robustness is restored over time; at time t1, the system is
returned to its original capacity. We called “duration of degradation” the time for
the system to bounce back to an acceptable performance.
For a community or an infrastructure, the loss of resilience, R, can be measured
as the expected loss in quality (probability of failure) over the time to recovery,




Q tð Þdt (1)
The resilience indicator, R, is a simple measure for quantifying resilience. In [5],
additional mathematical developments of this notion cover the probabilistic and
multidimensional aspects of resilience.
1.1 Contributions
The modeling method used in this chapter is based on the methodology of Mixed
Holistic Reductionist (MHR), where each infrastructure is divided into components
(reductionist layer), services (service layer) and holistic nodes (holistic layer).
The MHR approach is a guideline on how we can decompose each infrastructure
and how we can define the interconnection among the different components.
It also allows the identification of the right abstraction level due to the available
information.
The agent-based simulator, called CISIApro 2.0, is then used to implement this
approach. This simulator presents the consequences of adverse and positive events
in an interdependent scenario. In real-time, this simulator runs connected to a
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) control center to receive
current information on faults and linked to an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
to acquire actual threats and on-going cyber-attacks. CISIApro 2.0 integrates
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decision-making process. This version of the simulator has been improved
considering the telecommunication features. Specifically they are:
• Elements with multiple services
• Dynamic links
• Routing links
• Propagation models for ring topologies
• Continuous and discrete dynamics simulation inside the agents
• The possibility of co-simulating external dynamics
• The ability of revoke services
1.2 Organizations
This chapter is composed of the following sections: Section 2 analyses the idea of
risk and resilience; Section 3 reviews the literature on critical infrastructures simu-
lator; Section 4 presents the MHR approach while the simulator CISIApro 2.0 is
described in Section 5; a telecommunication case study is summarised in Section 6;
conclusions and future works are in Section 7.
2. The concepts of risk and resilience
The concepts of risk and resilience are similar and generally closely linked:
improving the system’s resilience requires reducing risk. Risk is commonly struc-
tured in terms of preparedness, mitigation measures, reaction capabilities, and
recovery processes; anticipation, absorption, adaptation and recovery are the typi-
cal components of resilience.
Owners and operators can improve the resilience of critical infrastructures by
specific operations: withstanding specific threats, reducing or mitigating potential
impacts, returning to normal operations if such degradation occurs. A resilience
methodology includes increasing preparedness for an incident, implementing
redundancy to mitigate the effects of an incident, and strengthening the coordina-
tion and execution of response and recovery procedures, for emergency action and
business continuity.
There are five main steps in the resilience cycle: prepare, prevent, protect,
response and recover. The resilience cycle must consider the consequences of inter-
dependencies among critical infrastructures. The tool we present in this chapter,
called CISIApro 2.0, aims to assess the consequences of adverse events on critical
infrastructures in terms of components, services and also holistic agents. CISIApro
2.0 usually helps the operators in the recovery phase, knowing which are the
possible consequences of actual adverse events.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines risk as “the potential for
an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as deter-
mined by its likelihood and the associated consequences” [6]. Thus, risk is histori-
cally characterized as a function of three elements: the threats to which an asset is
susceptible, the vulnerabilities of the asset to the threat, and the consequences
potentially generated by the asset’s deterioration.
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Threat is a “natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that
has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environ-
ment, and/or property” [6]. Sometimes the term hazard, which can be defined as a
“natural or man-made source or cause of harm or difficulty” [6], is used instead of
threat. However, a “hazard differs from a threat in that a threat is directed at an
entity, asset, system, network, or geographic area, while a hazard is not directed”
[6]. Vulnerability is a “physical feature or operational attribute that renders an
entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard” [6]. Consequences are
the “effects of an event, incident, or occurrence” [6].
The challenge is to determine where and how resilience integrates into risk
assessment as risk is a feature of threats and hazards, weaknesses, and conse-
quences. Resilience, as defined by DHS, is the “ability to resist, absorb, recover
from or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions” [6]. The DHS
lexicon also states that “Resilience can be factored into vulnerability and conse-
quence estimates when measuring risk” [6]. Therefore, the resilience will have an
effect on both vulnerability and consequences.
On the basis of these characteristics, it is possible to develop specific indicators
and metrics to assess the risk to an organization or an infrastructure. Considering a
threat or hazard (man-made or natural), the vulnerability and resilience of an
organization will impact the potential consequences of an event. The interaction
between the elements of risk is complex and made more so when one considers the
transfer of risk between assets in the case of a threat by an intelligent adversary.
3. Literature review on modelling interdependency
In literature, three main methodologies for the modelling approaches of critical
infrastructure modelling are presented: agent-based simulation, input–output anal-
ysis and network modelling. Please refer to [7] for heterogeneous and/or unclassi-
fied approaches.
Each infrastructure is considered by agent-based simulations to be a complex adap-
tive structure, consisting of agents representing single aspects of the infrastructure
itself. Different agents can be modelled at different degrees of abstraction based on the
proposed level of resolution modelling. The primary benefit of agent-based simulation
is the ability to establish synergistic behaviors as agents begin to work together [8].
The secondmethod is based on the economic theory of Input–Output proposed by
Leontief in the early 1930s, but later adapted tomodelling infrastructures. Haimes and
Jiang developed the linear input–output inoperabilitymodel (IIM) to research the
impact of interdependencies on the inoperability of interconnected networked systems
[9]. The key benefit of the IIM and its improvements is that the suggested solution is
simple and flexible. IIM is usually confined to the financial costs of interdependencies.
In recent years, researchers have investigated new approaches to
interdependency modelling of infrastructures. The most promising technique is
based on graph and network theory. This approach uses abstract graphs made of
nodes and arcs to describe infrastructures, representing links between components
within infrastructures. The key benefit is to leverage closed form expressions and
numerical simulations to characterise their topology, performance and uncertainty.
4. Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) approach
In this chapter, we propose an already applied approach, for helping during the
modelling phase. To maximize the benefits of holistic and reductionist approaches,
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the Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) [10] methodology was developed. The key
goal of MHR approach is to provide a potential road-map to model critical infra-
structures and their interdependencies properly.
In holistic modeling, infrastructures are seen as specific agents with defined
boundaries and functional properties, creating a global and overall analysis. The
purpose of presenting an infrastructure as a single element is to define the various
infrastructures and their geographical extent. The volume of data needed for
modeling activities is very limited at this stage and can be found in public data-sets.
In the other hand, to better appreciate the overall infrastructure, the reductionist
approach stresses the need to thoroughly understand the roles and behaviours of
individual components. The reductionist approach drills down to each component
in terms of inputs and outputs. At this level of abstraction is easy to find depen-
dencies between equipment and single components.
Various levels of analysis are required in modelled systems and their boundaries
are lost in the event of complex case studies. For the MHR model, either a top-down
or bottom-up approach might see relationships between infrastructures at different
levels. The other key benefit is to model infrastructures at at multiple complexity
levels, taking into account the quantity of data available.
The connection point between the two abstraction levels, i.e. holistic and reduc-
tionist approaches, is the quality of services (in the following, abbreviated as “ser-
vice”) which is a key element for operators. This layer describes functional
relationships between components and infrastructure at different levels of granu-
larity. Services to clients and to other interconnected infrastructures are specifically
treated in MHR as a middle layer between holistic and reductionist agents.
The MHR allows us to reach the right level of detail with minimal data and
collected information. Some important considerations can be summarised in the
following:
• Each infrastructure is modelled starting from the identification of components
and their interactions;
• Each layer is defined with an appropriate level of abstraction based on
information coming from end-users, stakeholders and open documents;
• Each component (we called it entity or agent) must be described in a way to
decouple it from other components: the behaviour of the component must
depend on the valued explicitly exchanged with the other components;
• The simulator must be able to represent any type of agent’s behaviour for
adapting to the specific reference scenario.
MHR approach allows to define three different typologies of agents: holistic
agent, service agent and reductionist agents.
The infrastructure as a whole (or its general organizational divisions) is
represented by a holistic agent (Figure 2) to provide a model that can understand
the global interactions between infrastructures.
A service agent represents a logical or organizational aspect, that provides an
aggregate resource as the remote control: the remote control generally provides
supervision, by means of software and data collection. Data can be collected
through telecommunication network or field equipment in case of a geographically
distributed infrastructure. In Figure 3, a service component is depicted considering
the classical model of an agent in CISIApro 2.0. Some examples of service are: the
ability to supply customers, the ability to produce resources, the ability to
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change topology, the aggregate state of a subset of specific and important
components.
Finally, with a reductionist agent, we can represent, with the right degree of
abstraction, all physical or aggregated entities of the overall system. In Figure 4, the
representation of a reductionist component is depicted. The picture does not
explicitly consider a cyber threat: this malicious event can be represented in the
same way as an input failure with a suitable “cyber dynamic”.
Finally, we can represent, with the right degree of abstraction, physical or
aggregated components of the overall system with a reductionist agent. The
Figure 2.
The holistic agent representation.
Figure 3.
The service agent representation.
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representation of a reductionist aspect is represented in the Figure 4. The input
failure contains natural disaster events, failures and faults, but also cyber threats.
5. CISIApro 2.0 simulator
In this chapter, CISIApro 2.0 simulates the impact of anomalies and security
attacks on the communication infrastructure and on the interlinked CIs. It will also
support the decision-making process allowing a “what-if analysis” by simulating the
application of countermeasures and reconfiguration and their impact on system
resilience.
CISIApro 2.0 (Critical Infrastructure Simulation by Interdependent Agents) [11]
is a software engine able to calculate complex cascading effects, taking into account
(inter)dependencies and faults propagation among the involved complex systems.
CISIApro 2.0 is an Agent-Based simulation software consisting primarily of two
modules, see Figure 5. The first one is the off-line tool in which it is possible to
design and implement complex and highly interdependent scenarios. While the
second one is the on-line tool which is implemented in Simulink (Mathworks).
CISIApro 2.0 is a database-centric architecture in which the database plays a key
role as deonstrated in Figure 5. This implies a centralized asynchronous design that
allows good modularity and scalability where each part of the IT infrastructure
interacts, independently, with the centralized database in order to access the last
data from the field (e.g. SCADA Systems), Complex Event Processing and generic
IoT (Internet of Things) data systems, but also the simulation’s outputs.
Using the Mixed-Holistic-Reductionist (MHR) approach, modelling complex
interdependent systems is a prerequisite to produce an effective model. Once
modelled the involved scenario, with MHR methodology can be applied with
CISIApro 2.0.
From this point of view, CISIApro 2.0 engine does not only analyze actual
situation and calculate the risk projected in the possible near future but, first, it
Figure 4.
The reductionist agent representation.
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plays the important role of Hybrid Risk Evaluation Tool. Hybrid because it is able to
get information of different natures (sensor and data acquisition and complex event
processing systems) and translating them in operational levels of resources, faults or
services for the entities introduced in the critical infrastructure model.
With the proposed architecture, through CISIApro 2.0 modelling software, it is
possible to dynamically change the interdependencies model and plugin other
modules in order to have a pseudo-real-time scalable and flexible system, which can
be changed at any time. The DB stores the information needed for the representa-




CISIApro 2.0 Graphical User Interface.
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• Each entity is a specific instance of an entity type;
• Each entity has a status made of variables with values;
• Each entity has ports for exchanging resources;
• Each resource is associated with a MHR layer/net;
• Each layer has proper interdependencies;
• Each interconnection is made of a couple of ports, associated to two entities.
It should be noted that CISIApro 2.0has introduced efficientways tomodel, execute
and debug simulations and cascading effects. In particular, an intuitive Graphical User
Interface, Figure 6, is provided to create entities and connect them in easy way.
6. Case study and results
The proposed scenario consists of three major components: the telecommunica-
tion network, the hospital ward and the smart factory. For industrial automation
and possible remote operations, the fifth generation of telecommunication
networks would be an essential improvement [12].
The telecommunication network of the reference scenario is represented in
Figure 7. The purpose of this network is to manufacture and deliver services and it
has a hierarchical structure consisting of three main sectors: backbone, metro and
access networks.
The Optical Packet Backbone (OPB) is a multi-service network that exchanges
voice, data and video services. This network is based on IP/MPLS (Multi-Protocol
Label Switching) technology and the network is fully redundant in all its components
and resistant to failure conditions to ensure a high level of the delivered services.
The Optical Packet Metro (OPM) network is a metropolitan and regional collec-
tion and aggregation network capable, depending on the configuration, of manag-
ing traffic flows at the Ethernet, IP or MPLS level. Like OPB, the OPM network is a
multi-service network in which both fixed and mobile services combine and, as
such, guarantee the requirements of scalability, reliability, availability, and flexibil-
ity. The access network meets end-users in the telecommunications industry and
greatly influences the features of the service offered.
There are several systems, each with varying efficiency and coverage zones, to
build “the last mile”, which is the part of the network that stretches from the client
site to the first access node. The latest generation of access network (GPON-Gigabit
Passive Optical Network) based on fiber optic infrastructure with OLT (Optical
Line Terminal) and ONU (Optical Network Unit) is briefly described at the bottom
left of Figure 7.
The distinctive aspect of this technology is the development of a network in
which many recipients are reached by a single optical fiber: this enables you to
prohibit the introduction of individual fiber ties between the control panel and the
receiver, thus minimizing the cost of infrastructure.
In the central part of the figure, we have a broadband network. The strength of
this technology, which has encouraged its growth and proliferation, lies in the fact
that voice and data services use the same copper cables as the conventional tele-
phone network. Data traffic received by the consumer is isolated by a splitter from
voice traffic and processed by a Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer
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(DSLAM) where the users’ broadband lines connected to that particular central
station are terminated.
On the right side of the picture, we insert the mobile network with the Base
Transceiver Station (BTS) of the GSM networks that consist of antennas and
transceivers responsible for the radio coverage of the territory.
The security fabric and data-center layer are achieved using a few
next-generation security devices and application controllers as:
• Fortinet FortiGate (URL Filtering, Centralised Antivirus, Intrusion Detection
and Protection System, E-mail filtering, Layer 4 Firewall)
• F5 BIGIP (Web Application Firewall).
Figure 7.
The representation of the telecommunication network of the scenario.
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Linked to the telecommunication network, we have a hospital ward represented
in Figure 8 that has been simplified to be modeled. This ward consists of a portion
of the electrical grid in the yellow blocks, the water networks in blue blocks, the
HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) system in green blocks. We
also add the building, made of eight rooms, where two are the operating rooms, and
six are other rooms. These are the physicians’ room, the staff room, the rooms used
for visits, the surgery, and the waiting room, and the storage of medication and
surgical supplies. These two types of rooms are modeled distinctly to underline their
different relevance in the ward: while the medical and operating rooms are dedi-
cated to patient care, must continue to provide the services requested optimally
even after a failure, on the contrary, a malfunction of ordinary rooms does not
drastically affect the quality of the service offered by the entire department.
The telecommunication network facilitates electrical hospital records to be
processed in the clouds and relies on network-connected medical devices and
systems.
Linked to the telecommunication network, a smart factor is present and is
modeled in Figure 9. The smart factory for this scenario was modeled with refer-
ence to the radio access network architecture implemented in the factories of the
future. Figure 9 shows a completely autonomous local architecture, characterized
by a pico site and an on-premises data center hub, which stores and performs data
processing locally. The pico site is a small cellular base station typically covering a
small area.
The 5G network is the best solution for this scenario [13, 14], which also makes it
possible to incorporate the remote control of robots: according to this model, in a
cloud environment, rather than in the robot itself, various functions aimed at
regulating motion can be stored. It is thus assumed that the security of the networks
in which the control modules work from cyber attacks is of vital importance.
The scenario contains also several services, modeled as service agents in
CISIApro 2.0. Among those services, we focus our attention on the “5G Service”,
which is also included in Figure 7. 5G technology helps you to manage and control
the movements of the programmable robotic arms remotely, increase human-
machine interaction, capture the information processed by these intelligent systems
and handle them in real-time. With regards to the hospital, the goal is to pervasively
Figure 8.
The hospital in CISIApro 2.0 simulator.
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interconnect healthcare structures, doctors, patients, and healthcare personnel, to
increase efficiency and effectiveness. In this context, the capabilities of 5G are
useful for remote surgery, for remote control of the vital parameters of patients
recovering from or suffering from chronic conditions and for exchanging medical
data in real-time between the different technical figures.
The case study aims to examine the effects of a cyber-attack on the 5G core
component, explicitly a DoS (Denial of Service). In this situation, we are not
interested in how this attack was carried out, but we are more interested in the
possible consequences of interconnected facilities.
The operative level of the “5G Core” agent is zero, as depicted in Figure 10,
because it is the node that can not produce any output resource. The other entities
of the telecommunications are not affected by this cyber-attack, because they don’t
need this service to properly work.
Different consequences affect the hospital and the smart factory. The domino
effect on the smart factory is depicted in Figure 11. In the factory, there are four
entities that need the 5G Core services to work: those entities are 5G-PGW-SGW,
5G-Pico, and the two antennas RU. Those elements are the red blocks in Figure 11,
and they have an operative level equal to zero because they can not properly
produce their outputs.
Figure 9.
The factory in CISIApro 2.0 simulator.
Figure 10.
The consequences on the “5G Core” component.
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Unlike the aforementioned elements, the two robots have an operative level of
0.4: although they cannot be controlled remotely or the information processed by
them can be collected, however, these intelligent systems continue to operate.
In Figure 12, the output for the hospital is depicted. The absence of the 5G
service has a more significant impact on medical rooms and operating rooms, due to
the importance that hospital infrastructure has. In fact, despite following the cyber
attack, it is no longer possible to carry out remote surgery, remotely monitor the
vital parameters of patients and manage electronic medical records, these health
rooms are still available for use and to ensure adequate care for patients.
7. Conclusions
This chapter analyses the concept of risk and resilience for critical infrastruc-
tures. The two concepts are tied together: minimizing risk means improving
Figure 11.
The consequences on the factory section in CISIApro 2.0.
Figure 12.
The consequences on the hospital section.
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resilience. In critical infrastructure protection world, assessing risk is very complex
due to, among the others, due to interdependency: managing risk is well-established
in each infrastructure, but the risk of interconnected infrastructures is still an open
problem without a single solution.
Modelling infrastructures and their interdependencies could help in managing
risk and also resilience. The proposed approach is called MHR and it is implemented
with CISIApro 2.0, an agent-based simulator, which assesses the consequences of
events on the reference scenario. We test the proposed approach into a telecom-
munication scenario, with a hospital ward and a smart factory. The results demon-
strate the correctness of this approach that is currently under validation within the
EU H2020 RESISTO project. During the project, the system will be integrated into
real test-bed provided by various telecommunication providers.
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